Memoir to the Pollock Medal

This book, published in 1875, was written to accompany the presentation of the Pollock Prize, an award given to the best cadet of the season at, first, the Military Academy at Addiscombe, and later the Royal Military College at Woolwich. It contains a brief biography of Field Marshal Sir George Pollock and quite a comprehensive study of his campaign in Afghanistan in 1842.

I have respected the original spelling and grammar, and the only changes I have made in the punctuation is to remove the speech marks at the beginning of each line of the quotations contained within the text.

For those looking for references to specific places and people, the following are mentioned:

Addiscombe – Afghanistan – Agra - Ali Musjid Fortress - Ava
Balla Hissar – Bamean (Bamian) – Begramee – Bengal – Bhurtpore – Bolan Pass – Bombay – Boodkhak – Budeeabad – Burmah (Burma)
Cabul (Kabul) – Calcutta – Candahar (Kandahar or Qandahar) – Cawnpore (Kanpur) – Charekur (Charikar)
Deig – Dinapore - Dum Dum
East India Military Seminary, Addiscombe
Ferozepore (Firozpur) – France – Futtehabad
Ghorebund Valley – Ghuznee (Ghazni) – Great Bazaar of Kabul – Gundamuck
Hindoo-Koosh (Hindu-Kush) – Hindostan – Huft-Kotul – Hykulzye
Indus – Istaliff
Jellalabad (Jalalabad) – Jugdulluck – Jugdulluck Pass – Jumrood
Khelat-i-Ghilzye (Qalat) – Khyber Pass – Kohistan – Kojuck Pass – Koochle Khail – Koord Cabul Pass
Lahore – Lalpoora – Lucknow
Mammoo Khail or Mamoo Khail – Meerut – Mookoor (Moqor) – Mydan
Nepaul (Nepal)
Pagahm Mew – Peninsula – Peshawur (Peshawar) – Prome (Pyè) – Punjaub (Punjab)
Quetta
Rangoon – Royal Military Academy, Woolwich – Roza
Shinwarree Valley – Simbike – Sindh – Sukkur or Sukhur – Sultanpore - Sutlej River - Sydeabad
Tezeen – Toorkistan (Turkistan) – Tower of London
Urghundeh
Vauxhall – Vittoria
Westminster – Westminster Abbey – Woolwich
Yandaboo (Yandoon?)

People: Those indicate with a (1) are Cadets from Addiscombe or Woolwich who were awarded the Pollock Prize.

Abbott, Captain (Sir Frederick) - Addison, John C. (1) - Akbar Khan - Alexander the Great - Ameen-oollah Khan - Anderson - Anquetil , Brigadier - Auckland, Lord
Backhouse - Basevi, James P. (1) - Beauchamp, Clayton S. (1) - Bhurtpore, Rajah of - Bolton, Colonel - Broadbent, John E. (1) - Broadfoot, Captain - Brydon, Dr. - Burgoyne, Field Marshal Sir John - Burnes, Sir Alexander - Bygrave, Captain
Cameron, Maurice A. (1) - Campbell, John C. (1) - Campbell, William M. (1) - Campbell,Sir Archibald - Cardew, Phillip (1) - Chambers, Harry M. (1) - Champain, John M. (1) - Chermside, Herbert C. (1) - Christie, Captain - Clarke, George S. (1) - Clerk, George - Cotton, General - Craigie, Captain - Craster, George A. (1) - Cunningham, Allan J. C. (1) - Cunynghame, Henry H. S. (1)
Davis, Lieut. - Day, Francis J. (1) - Delafosse, Major - Dost Mohammed - Durand, Lieutenant (Sir Henry)
Eckford, John (1) - Ellenborough, Lord - Elliot, Arthur W. (1) - Elphinstone, General - England, General
Fraser, General - Fraser, Thomas (1) - G. R. Gleig, Reverend - George III, King - Georges, Henry R. G. (1) - Gholab Singh, General - Godsal, William C. (1) - Goodwyn, Henry (1) - Gordon, Lewis C. (1) - Grant, Sir Francis
Hadden, Charles F. (1) - Hardinge, Lord - Harman, Henry J. (1) - Hastings, Lord - Herschel, John (1) - Holkar, Chieftain - Holland, Edward R. (1)
Innes, James J. Mc. L. (1)
Jacob, Sydney L. (1) - Jeffreys, William (1) - Johnson, Captain - Jopp, Keith A. (1)
Kaye, Sir J. W. - Khelati-Ghilzye, Khan of - Knocker, Herbert P. (1) - Kunhardt, Henry G. (1)
Lake, General (Lord) - Lang, Arthur M. (1) - Lawrence, Henry - Lockwood - Love, Henry D. (1) - Lowe, C. R. - Luard, Charles H. (1)
Macdonald, Aeneas R. R. (1) - Macgregor, Major - Mackeson - Macleod, General - Macnaghten, Lady - Macnaghten, Sir William - Maddock, T. H. - Mahomed Akbar - Mascall, Francis (1) - M'Caskill, Brigadier - McCallum, Henry E. (1) - McNeile, John M. (1) - Monteith, Brigadier - Montgomerie, Thomas G. (1)
Nicholson, William G. (1) - Nicolls, Sir Jasper - Nott, General
Outram, Sir James
Palmer, Colonel - Peel, Sir Robert - Pierson, William H. (1) - Pye, Kellow C. (1)
Rawlinson, Major (Sir Henry) - Robertson - Rowe, Valentine F. (1) - Runjeet Singh
Sale, General Sir Robert - Sale, Lady - Sankey, Matthew H. P. R. (1) - Shakespeare, Sir Richmond - Shelton, Brigadier - Shepherd, William (1) - Sinclair, Hugh M. (1) - Soojah, Shah - Stanton, Frederick S. (1) - Stewart, Patrick (1) - Sturt, Lieutenant
Tait - Taylor, Colonel - Trevor, Salisbury T. (1) - Tulloch, Colonel
Villamil, Richard de (1)
Walker, Lieut. - Watson, Charles M. (1) - Wellington, Duke of - Wild, Brigadier - Wilkinson - Williams, Edward C.S. (1) - Williamson, William J. (1) - Wiltshire, General - Wolski, Felician R. de (1) - Woodburn - Wymer, Colonel - Wyon, Mr
Ynett

Memoir
EXTRACTED AND COMPILED FROM Various SOURCES,
TO ILLUSTRATE
THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION
OF THE
POLLOCK MEDAL.
----------------------------------
WOOLWICH :
BODDY AND CO., MILITARY PUBLISHERS.
---------
1875

Memoir,
DEDICATED TO THE MEDALLISTS,
Past and Future,
By one who has the highest veneration
For the Memory of
The First British Artillery Officer,
Who ever commanded an army in the field,
And whose successes,
As briefly sketched herein,
Give promise of what may be expected from those,
who,
Educated at the
ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY,
Follow their profession
With unwearied zeal and attention,
And are thus at all times
Ready to seize any opportunity that may offer
In the path of duty,
For reaping honour in the service of
Their Queen and Country.

ON 4th June, 1786, within the precincts of Westminster, was born George; the youngest of the four sons of Mr. David Pollock, saddler to His Majesty George III.

The family was of Scottish extraction. Three of Mr. Pollock's sons rose to distinction. The eldest, Sir David, became a judge of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay. Sir Frederick, the second son, achieved a brilliant reputation as a scholar, lawyer, and statesman; he filled the office of Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer for 22 years, and had the dignity of a baronetcy conferred upon him.

The brothers Frederick and George went to a school at Vauxhall, from which the latter, the subject of the present Memoir, proceeded to the Royal Military Academy, at Woolwich, which he entered on the 21st January, 1801, and left on the 7th May, 1803. Though he passed an examination which entitled him to elect service either in the Royal Artillery or Royal Engineers, he preferred the Artillery on the Bengal Establishment, at that time consisting of three battalions of seven companies each, as affording a better field for military advancement. The East India Military Seminary at Addisconbe not having been established until 1809 the officers of the Ordnance Services of the Honourable East India Company received their military education previously to that year at Woolwich.

In September, 1803, he embarked for India, and arrived, after a voyage of four months, at Calcutta. His first commission, dated November, 1803, was that of "Lieutenant Fireworker;" on the 19th April, 1804, when at the head quarters of his regiment at Dum Dum, he received his promotion as Lieutenant of Artillery.

The first action in which Lieutenant Pollock took part was the Battle of Deig, fought on the 13th November, 1804, between the British infantry of General Lake's army, under the command of General Fraser, and the famous Mahratta Chieftain Holkar. Pollock took a prominent part with his guns in this battle, described by Lord Lake as "the hardest fought on this side India," and as "a very near business," and was soon after placed in charge of a mortar battery at the siege of Deig, which city fell on Christmas-day of the same year. He was present at the siege of Bhurtpore, which proved unsuccessful after 50 days of open trenches, from the 4th January to the 22nd February, 1805, four assaults, and a loss of 3,100 men and 103 officers in killed and wounded, out of a total force of 10,000 men engaged. The pertinacity of the British force under Lord Lake, however, served to break up the alliance between Holkar and the Rajah of Bhurtpore, who eventually signed a treaty accepting the conditions of peace imposed upon him by the English general. In the following campaign George Pollock, being still a subaltern in his teens, was given the command of a .field battery of six six-pounders, which formed the only European portion of a brigade detached in pursuit of Holkar; while on this duty he was ordered to open fire on the Sepoys, who had broken out into open mutiny, if they continued to disobey orders. Fortunately the affair was arranged without recourse being had to such severity as might possibly have led to the massacre of every European in the force and the desertion of the whole body of natives.

Holkar soon sued for peace, which was signed early in l806, when Pollock was sent with his battery to Meerut, then a frontier station. After a few months Lord Lake, as a reward for his good services, appointed him Quarter-master of one of the battalions of artillery stationed at Dum Dum, from which he was soon removed to Cawnpore, having been selected for the post of Adjutant and Quartermaster to the artillery in the field at that station, which he held until his promotion to full Captain, on the 1st March, 1812. Meanwhile Pollock had received a commission from the Governor-General as Captain-lieutenant, on the 17th September, 1805, although his King's commission of that rank was not given until the 1st December, 1809.

On his promotion to full captain he was ordered again to Dum Dum, where for some time he performed the duties of Brigade-major to the whole of the artillery of the Bengal army.

The next occasion on which he saw active service was during the war in Nepaul, in 1814-16, where he commanded two companies of the Bengal artillery, but was attached to a portion of the army which, through the incompetence of its general, did not take any glorious part in the operations.

After this campaign he was appointed by Lord Hastings to the vacant post of Brigade-major of the Bengal artillery. He received the brevet of Major on the 12th August, 1819, and on the 4th May following was gazetted to the same substantive rank, which, according to the rules of the service then existing, entailed the relinquishment of the post of Brigade-major. He was, however, almost immediately made "Assistant-adjutant-general to the artillery" a new appointment which Lord Hastings appears to have created in order to retain Pollock on the staff, and which he held with credit to himself and advantage to his regiment until he received his commission as Lieutenant-colonel on the 1st May, 1824.

About this time Pollock was ordered to return to England for his health. As with his heavy family expenses he could ill afford to leave India the thought occurred to him that, war having commenced with Burmah, he would try to go there, hoping that the short sea voyage, with the excitement of active service, might effect a cure. He accordingly volunteered, and his services having been accepted, he joined the force at Rangoon soon after its capture, in 1824, as commanding officer of the Bengal artillery attached to the army, of which Sir Archibald Campbell was Commander-in-chief.

He was present, as commanding officer of artillery, with General Cotton's division at the storming of the stockades at Simbike, in front of Prome, and at the defeat of the Shaans on the 1st December, 1825, when the Commander-in-chief, in his despatches, made favourable mention of his service. General Cotton, upon whose division the brunt of the work fell, candidly owned that his success was due to his Commandant of artillery.

Colonel Pollock was again specially mentioned in the despatches of the Commander-in-chief for his conduct at the capture of Mellown on the 19th January, 1826, on which occasion the general wrote that the artillery occupied the most conspicuous place in the events of the day.

He also took part in the important action at Pagahm Mew, on the 9th February, when the Burmans, "departing from their cautious system of defence behind field works and entrenchments, which formed their usual device of war, and relying on their great numerical superiority, combined with singular advantages of ground, ventured on a succession of bold manoeuvres on the flanks and front of the British columns." The storming of Pagahm Mew immediately following the action decided the war, which was finally brought to an end by the treaty of Yandaboo, signed at that place on the 24th February, 1826, the army being then only three days' march from Ava.

This war was remarkable not so much for the complete and almost bloodless character of its chief victories as for the boldness and arduous nature of the marches in a bad climate, over. indifferent roads, into territories far distant from the basis of operations, and in which a severe outbreak of cholera had to be contended with; it tried the energies of all engaged, and not the least so of the subject of this Memoir, who had to organise the means for conveying his guns, employing horses and oxen with native drivers and syces of various nationalities, including even Burmese, and who, notwithstanding the great length of the marches and the almost impassable nature of the roads, had his guns always ready and well to the front whenever required.

Colonel Pollock's meritorious services in this war were specially acknowledged by the Governor-General in council in the general order thanking the troops, and gained for him the Companionship of the Bath.

At the end of the war Colonel Pollock returned to Calcutta, but his health had been so rudely shaken by all the exposure and hardships he had undergone that it soon completely broke down, necessitating sick leave to England for a lengthened period. He accordingly embarked from Calcutta early in the year 1827, nine months of which he passed on the sea on his passage home. While in England he was promoted to a brevet colonelcy in the Company's service on the 1st December, 1829, but did not receive his King's commission of that rank until the 3rd March, 1836.

Thanks to his native air, Pollock's health was soon completely restored. He returned to India in 1830, and was posted to the command of a battalion of artillery at Cawnpore, where he remained until, owing to his standing in the service, he was nominated early in 1838 as Brigadier general to command the division at Dinapore. He was subsequently posted to the command of the Agra district, and on the 28th June, 1838, was promoted to the rank of Major-general.

We are now approaching that portion of Pollock's career on which rests his claim to rank among the greatest of Indian generals. In the year 1838, Lord Auckland, the Governor-General of India, desirous of erecting a bulwark against Russian aggression, resolved to dethrone Dost Mohammed, the ruler of Cabul, and to replace him by Shah Soojah, who had formerly occupied that throne. With this object a British army invaded Afghanistan, passing through the Bolan Pass, and after taking Ghuznee with its famous citadel by assault, on the 23rd July, entered Cabul on the 6th August, 1839; Dost Mohammed fled and Shah Soojah was proclaimed king.

The war being considered at an end, the army was broken up, part of the Bengal troops returning by Jellalabad and the Khyber Pass to Peshawur, and thence through Runjeet Singh's dominions to the British provinces, while the Bombay column, under General Wiltshire, returned to India by the Bolan Pass, having first captured by assault, on the 13th November, 1839, Khelati-Ghilzye, the Khan of which was killed, and part of his Khanate confiscated and attached to the dominions of Shah Soojah. A British force, however, remained to assist the Shah's troops, which had been raised and organised and were in great measure commanded by British officers, in maintaining the puppet king who had been placed on the throne. Towards the end of 1841 the British troops in Afghanistan were under the command of General Elphinstone, a brave officer of good repute, gentlemanly manners, and aristocratic connections, but with no Indian experience of any kind. The chief qualification that determined his selection for this distant and trying command was that he was of a ductile nature, with few opinions of his own to clash with those of Sir William Macnaghten, the accredited minister and agent of the Governor-General at the court of the Shah. Under General Elphinstone were Generals Sir Robert Sale, and Nott, and Brigadier Shelton. Brigadier Anquetil was in command of the Shah's forces.

Sir Robert Sale had been detached with his brigade to tranquilize the country in the direction of Jellalabad; General Nott was at Candahar with outlying detachments at Ghuznee under Colonel Palmer and at Khelat-i-Ghilzye under Captain Craigie, while Elphinstone with Shelton and Anquetil was in cantonments close to Cabul, Sir W. Macnaghten and his political staff being with him.

These cantonments were in the plain outside the city, and about two miles from the Balla Hissar, or Citadel of Cabul, a large fortress on a hill completely overlooking the Shah' s palace and the city, and containing accommodation for a considerable garrison. When it

was first determined that the British troops were to remain in the country, a council had been held to decide the important question of the positions they were to occupy. Lieutenant (afterwards Sir Henry) Durand of the Bengal Engineers, who had been appointed chief engineer to the Shah's forces, and had been called to the council, insisted that the only fit position for the troops was the Balla Hissar, but Sir W. Macnaghten weakly attended to the political objections of the Shah to its occupation, and the cantonments were therefore built outside the city in a defenceless position. The want of common sense and firmness thus displayed by those upon whom the success of the enterprise depended was such that Durand threw up his appointment and returned to India in disgust.

The faulty position of the army encouraged the disaffection which was rife in the country, and the efforts to maintain the Shah were unsuccessful. A terrible outbreak occurred in the city on the 2nd November, 1841, when Sir Alexander Burnes and several other British officers were murdered. If prompt and vigorous action had then been aroused, and if the Balla Hissar had been seized, as advised by some officers and especially by Lieutenant Sturt of the Engineers, who had succeeded Durand as Engineer to the Shah's forces, and who urged that the position of the force in cantonments was untenable, the insurrection would have been strangled in its birth; the British forces, about 5000 combatants, would have had the city in their power, while they themselves would have been in a secure position, from which the united efforts of the whole Afghan race would not have been able to dislodge them. Instead of assuming this defiant attitude, a series of misunderstandings commenced; and conflicts of opinion, which in the absence of a resolute and master mind to fulfil the responsibilities of command, brought disaster upon disaster. The army was shut up in its cantonments, allowed the enemy to seize a small detached fort containing its commissariat stores, which by some unaccountable mismanagement were not within its lines, and at length submitted to the disgrace of witnessing the foulest indignity one nation can place upon another. The murder of the ambassador, Sir W. Macnaghten, on the 23rd December, in the performance of his ambassadorial duties, in broad day, upon the open plain, within 600 yards of their cantonments, roused not the dormant energies of the military Chiefs, nor awakened them to a sense of the depths of humiliation In which they were plunging their unhappy country; not a trigger was pulled; not a gun fired; not a company moved to rescue or to avenge. This lamentable inaction of a highly trained force, which included one of Her Majesty's regiments of British Infantry, and a number of native troops commanded by officers distinguished for personal courage, was solely attributable to the folly of Government in entrusting the chief command to a general, who, although possessing high personal courage, was borne down by years and physical infirmities.

The result, sad as it was, scarcely exceeds what might have been expected; a treaty was made with the insurrectionary chiefs according to which all the garrisons in Afghanistan were to be evacuated, and the British forces withdrawn from the country;

Dost Mohammed, who was a prisoner in India, was to be released and restored; a large sum was to be paid as ransom; all spare stores and small arms were to be surrendered, and all the gums except six field pieces, which were to accompany the retreating force, were to be given up to the enemy; a crowning indignity than which nothing could be more mortifying, nothing more humiliating to soldiers taught to honour their gums and regard them as trophies to be defended as obstinately and held as dearly as the consecrated colours of their regiments; and as if such moral degradation were not sufficient, the enemy demanded that General Sale, with his wife and daughter, and the other Europeans who were married, with their wives and children, should be left as hostages until the arrival of Dost Mohammed and other Afghan prisoners from Hindostan.

This last demand, however, was rejected, but immediately that this miserable treaty had been signed, the enemy, believing that the Feringhees had sunk into hopeless cowardice, assumed a still more haughty and insolent tone.

During the long weary blockade in their entrenched cantonments, which had lasted sixty-five days from the first outbreak, the troops and camp followers, had become enfeebled by continued watching; by occasional sorties, in which many gallant soldiers had fallen nobly on the field of battle, and by harassing duties on reduced rations, until at length when they commenced their fatal march on the 6th of January, 1842, although many brave men were bracing themselves up in the desperate resolution to sell their lives dearly to the enemy, if treachery were at work for their destruction, the great mass of the force was in sore condition to endure the fatigues of a long weary march in snow and frost, through the mountain fastnesses which separated them from Jellalabad, the nearest point on their road at which they could hope for support.

The English ladies and children accompanied the retiring troops, for the protection of whom, from the furious zeal of the Ghazees, and the uncontrollable cupidity of the Afghan bandits who infested the mountains through which they had to pass, it was humiliatingly agreed that the chiefs should furnish an escort. The arrangements of the march were of the worst; there was no order; already, on the 7th, the effect of the sharp frosts and exposure had told; there was no shelter, no fire-wood, no food, and the sun rose on many stiffened corpses. The enemy were pressing on the rear, seizing baggage, and capturing guns. The soldiers weary, feeble and frost-bitten, could make no stand against the fierce charges of the Afghan horsemen; all thoughts of effectual resistance were at an end, and there was nothing to be hoped for but from the forbearance of the treacherous Afghan chiefs.

On the 8th of January, having only cleared ten miles in the two previous days march, the force entered the stupendous pass of Koord Cabul, which for a distance of five miles runs between precipitous mountain ranges, so narrow and so shut in on either side that the wintry sun rarely penetrates its gloomy recesses. Into the jaws of this terrible defile the disorganised force struggled in fearful confusion. In vain did some of the chiefs endeavour to control the hordes of fanatic Ghilzyes, who poured upon the straggling rabble a deadly fire from their jezails. Pent in between the walls of the narrow pass, now splashing through the mountain torrent, now floundering through the snow which filled the hollows, the wretched fugitives fell an easy prey to the Ghilzye marksmen who shot them down from the hill sides. Baggage, ammunition, public and private property, all were abandoned, and the Sepoys suffered their very firelocks to be taken out of their hands. The massacre was fearful in this Koord Cabul Pass. Three thousand men are believed to have here fallen under the fire of the enemy, or to have dropped down exhausted to be afterwards slaughtered by Afghan knives, and amidst these fearful scenes rode English ladies, whose agonies were enhanced by the sufferings of their children who accompanied them.

Another night in the snow now deepened by a heavy fall, spent by the perishing troops without shelter, firewood, or food, was followed by a day of irresolution. The General ordered a halt while negotiating with Akbar Khan, and at length, as he himself states, "desirous to remove the ladies and children from the further dangers of our camp, and hoping that, as from the very commencement of the negotiations the Sirdar had shown the greatest anxiety to have the married people as hostages, this mark of trust might elicit a corresponding feeling in him," he complied with the request, and so Lady Macnaghten, Lady Sale and the other widows and wives of the British officers, with their children, passed into the hands of the son of Dost Mohammed Khan, the sovereign whom the army had deposed. The married officers accompanied their wives, and on the following morning, 10th of January, the remnant of the doomed force resumed its march, in the same miserable confusion as on the preceding day. Soldiers and camp followers rushed promiscuously to the front. The native regiments were fast melting into nothing; throwing down their arms and crowding in among the camp followers, the Sepoys were rapidly swelling the disorganised rabble in front; their hands were frost-bitten; they could not pull a trigger; they were paralyzed, panic struck; whilst the Afghans watching their cruel opportunity, came down with their long knives among their unresisting victims, and slaughtered them like sheep. A narrow gorge between the precipitous spurs of two hills was the appointed shambles; there the dead and dying soon choked up the defile. There was not now a single Sepoy left.

About 50 horse artillerymen with one howitzer; some 250 men of H.M.'s 44th regiment, and 150 cavalry troopers now constituted the entire force. Of the 16,500 men - soldiers and camp followers - who had left Cabul on the 6th, not one fourth survived, and had it not been for the persevering energy and unflinching fortitude of Brigadier Shelton, who commanded the rear with a few Europeans, it is probable the whole would then have been sacrificed.

After another attempt at negotiation, in which the proposition that the remnant of the British army should lay down their arms had been promptly rejected by Elphinstone, the survivors pressed forward, hoping to reach Jugdulluck by a rapid night march, but day dawned upon them when they were still ten miles distant from it. After a short halt they pushed on, covered by Shelton, who, with a few brave men of the rear guard, faced the overwhelming crowd of Afghans with determined courage, gallantly held them in check, fighting their way to Jugdulluck, behind the ruined walls of which they were soon compelled to seek safety from the hot fire of the enemy's jezails. All night long and throughout the next day, 12th January, the force halted at Jugdulluck, while negotiations were resumed with the Sirdar, who having invited Elphinstone, Shelton, and Captain Johnson to a conference, basely retained them as hostages for the evacuation of Jellalabad. On the evening of the 12th the few remaining men, about 125 in all, resumed their perilous march, and after fighting their way bravely to the summit of the Jugdulluck pass, came upon a barrier which closed the defile. Here the Afghans lay in wait for them, and after a desperate fight, in which twelve officers fell and a greater part of the force was massacred, a few officers and men cleared the barrier, and about daybreak reached Gundamuck, a party of some 65 Europeans, with only two rounds of ammunition in the pouches of the men. The chief of the district made overtures for their surrender, but while the negotiations were pending, the enemy, who swarmed around, fell on the little party and cut them up almost to a man. One officer of the 44th, who had wrapped the regimental colour round his waist, and a few privates were taken prisoners, and a small party of six others reached Futtehabad, sixteen miles from Jellalabad, but were then attacked by the natives and one only escaped.

Very different was the fate of Sale's brigade, which had been detached from Cabul to tranquilize the country between it and Jellalabad, in which the Ghilzyes were in a state of open hostility. It consisted of Sale's own regiment, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, the 35th Native Infantry, Captain Abbott's battery of European Artillery, two guns of European Horse Artillery under Lieut. Walker, with some mountain guns, 3-prs., under Lieut. Davis , a. squadron of the 5th Regiment of Bengal Light Cavalry, and another of Anderson's Irregular Horse, with 400 Sappers and Miners under Captain Broadfoot.

After some hard fighting, Sir Robert Sale had reached Gundamuck on the 30th October, where he received information of the outbreak at Cabul, with orders to retrace his steps. His losses in officers and men, however, by continuous hard fighting, forcing his way through the narrow and difficult passes which now separated him from Cabul, had been very severe; the whole of his camp equipage had been destroyed; he was encumbered with 300 sick and wounded, surrounded by enemies, and embarrassed by treacherous allies, having no secure depôt in which to place his sick, no depôt of provisions on the route, not sufficient transport to carry a single day's provisions, and "without sufficient ammunition two such contests as he would assuredly have had to sustain for six days at least." Under these circumstances he "could not force the passes of either Jugdulluck or Koord Cabul," and therefore he decided, and, on the 11th November marched, to seize Jellalabad, and "hold it, if possible, until the Cabul force should fall back upon him, or succour arrive from Peshawur or India."

On the 13th November, Sale took possession of the town, which, though surrounded by fortifications, was absolutely without any real defences, the troops within its dilapidated walls and filled up ditches being almost as much exposed as in the open country. The extent of the works was great, embracing a circuit of upwards of 2300 yards, and it was quite impossible to man them; but guards were posted at all the gates, and a strong piquet, in a central position, was held In readiness to send support to any point from which the sound of firing might proceed. The remainder of the troops were allowed to lie down to rest by companies, with their officers beside them, while the measures to be taken for the defence of the city of Jellalabad were being considered.

The dilapidated works were examined and found in the most wretched condition; 400 yards, continuously, were In such a state that none of the garrison could show themselves upon them except at one spot, but it was decided to defend the place, and Captain Broadfoot, having been appointed garrison engineer, set about the repair of the defences with all the energy and zeal for which he was distinguished. His little corps of sappers had brought their working tools with them from Cabul, in spite of great difficulties and some opposition, and were now ready to ply them with the heartiest goodwill. There was not a soldier in the force, European or native, who was not eager to join In the work, and did not recognise the hitherto despised tools as only second in importance to their arms for assuring their safety.

After dispersing the enemy, who had assembled in large numbers to molest them, by a well-led sortie on the 16th of November, the works proceeded apace; ammunition was prepared by Abbott and his artillerymen; provisions were collected, and although the soldiers were on half rations and deprived of their accustomed drams, there being no ardent liquors in the .town, there was no grumbling, no dissatisfaction, and it was never said that a man was unequal to his accustomed duties; it is recorded on the contrary that "the gallant men who composed the garrison of Jellalabad took their half rations cheerfully, and cheerfully did double work."

Again, on the 1st December, the enemy, who had collected in force under the walls, were routed In a sortie, after which the labours of the garrison, who were in fine health, in good working condition, and in an admirable state of discipline, proceeded without molestation, and the works began to assume an appearance of effective defence, but disastrous rumours were coming in from Cabul, gradually increasing in intensity, until at length, on the 2nd January, authentic information was received that the Cabul force was falling hack on Jellalabad, followed, on the 8th, by an order from General Elphinstone to evacuate the place, and hand it over to an Afghan chief, who was to have brought the order, in which he was designated Governor of Jellalabad, and return forthwith to India.

Happily Sir Robert Sale and Major Macgregor the political agent attached to his force, adopted a worthier' resolution, and declined to deliver up the city and the works raised around it by the garrison for their, defence. It would, moreover, have been useless to have done so; the Cabul force would not have been aided thereby; the only secure point between it and India would have been lost, and the garrison in their retreat upon India, through the fastnesses of the Khyber, then covered with snow, would almost inevitably have been destroyed.

It is recorded that four days later, on the 13th January, when the garrison were still busy on the works, toiling with axe and shovel, with their arms piled and accoutrements laid out close at hand, a sentry looking towards the Cabul road saw a solitary white‑faced horseman struggling towards the fort. The tidings spread, the ramparts were lined with straining eyes. Slowly and painfully the solitary mounted man came reeling, tottering on. They saw he was an Englishman, on a wretched, weary pony, clinging as one sick or wounded to its neck. A shudder ran through the garrison. Their worst forebodings were confirmed. There was the one man who was to tell the story of the massacre of an army. A party of cavalry, sent to succour him, brought him in wounded, exhausted, half dead. The messenger was Dr. Brydon, who reported his belief that he was the sole survivor of a force of 4,500 fighting men and about 12,000 camp followers, who with him had left Cabul only seven short days before.

How it happened that such an army as that commanded by General Elphinstone had been brought to such a condition as to he compelled to evacuate Cabul, and had then been so disastrously beaten and at length destroyed, by an enemy of such calibre as these undisciplined Afghans, was a terrible mystery to the brave men of the garrison of Jellalabad, who had been scattering their opponents like sheep. No difference in the troops can account for it; the mystery is alone to be solved by considering the character of the political and military chiefs, who by the will of God were entrusted with the supreme direction of the two forces. The sad news of these terrible disasters caused the greatest despondency throughout India in all minds, from the Governor‑General and Commander-in-chief downwards. A great crisis had suddenly arisen and the Governor-General, Lord Auckland, who had been created an Earl only two years before, for conquering and tranquilizing Afghanistan, was not equal to it. He began to doubt the justice and expediency of his policy, and in the bewilderment and perplexity which followed the blow that had descended upon him, he seems to have forgotten the paramount necessity of demonstrating to all the nations of the East the invincibility of British arms, upon the prestige of which our Indian Empire so much depends, and with a great army at his call, to have thought only of extrication and retreat. of abandoning instead of regaining our position.

The Commander-in-chief, Sir Jasper Nicolls, who had been consistently opposed to the entire scheme of Afghan invasion, and had with rare prescience and sagacity foretold the disastrous downfall of a policy based upon a foundation of complicated error, was equally averse to sending strong reinforcements to the support of the troops in Afghanistan, forgetting that the restoration of the military supremacy of Great Britain in Central Asia was to be achieved; in such a crisis, whatever might be the scruples of the statesman, the soldier ought not to have hesitated for a moment, supineness being more likely than activity to provoke aggression.

Happily, there were other functionaries nearer to the scene of action at the time, whose judgment dictated a more energetic course of procedure.

Mr. Robertson, the lieutenant governor of the north-west provinces, and. Mr. George Clerk, the Governor-General's agent on the north-western frontier, both recognised the paramount necessity of pushing on troops to Peshawur, and already, on the 26th of November, four regiments of native infantry, the 30th, 53rd. 60th and 64th, with a few artillerymen to reinforce a company in Afghanistan, under Brigadier Wild,. had by their instructions crossed the Sutlej, and preparations were begun for the despatch of another brigade with artillery and cavalry; but these were stopped by the Commander-in-chief, who wrote to Brigadier Wild, to borrow guns, of which he had none of his own, from the Sikhs, and to man them with the few gunner's who accompanied his force. Meanwhile, Mr Clerk continued to get additional reinforcements in readiness, and although the Commander-in-chief was "not prepared," and the Governor-General thought it "undesirable" to send more troops in advance, permission was at length given, and on the 4th of June, 1842, a second brigade, under Brigadier M'Caskill, consisting of H.M.'s 9th regiment, the 26th native infantry and the 10th light (native) cavalry, and half a battery of artillery with three guns, altogether, 3,034 fighting men, crossed the Sutlej, also on its way to Peshawur.

While the preparations were proceeding for the despatch of these troops, a discussion had arisen as to the appointment of an officer to command them. It was necessary to select a man of good military repute and of unquestionable energy and activity, combined with a cool judgement and sound discretion; but here again there was diversity of opinion; the Commander-in-chief wished to appoint a royal officer, while the Governor-General desired to see an experienced officer of the Company's service, at the head of affairs, and at length after much hesitation, the choice fell upon Major General George Pollock, then commanding the garrison at Agra, whose merit was even at that time so thoroughly established that his appointment gave universal satisfaction. His nomination was believed to be free from the corruption of undue influence, and the taint of personal favouritism, and it was felt that the selection had been made on the ground of individual merit. Sir J. W. Kaye, from whose " History of the war in Afghanistan " a great part of this Memoir has been borrowed, writes:

"The merit thus rewarded was of the most modest and unostentatious character. There was not perhaps in the whole Indian army a man of more unassuming there manners and a more retiring disposition ;was not one less likely to have sought notoriety for its own sake, or to have put himself forward in an attempt to obtain it. Pollock's merits did not lie upon the surface. He was not what is called a dashing officer; he shrunk from anything like personal display, and never appealed to the vulgar weaknesses of an unreflecting community. But beneath an unassuming exterior, there lay a fund of good sense, of innate sagacity, of quiet firmness and collectedness. He was equable and temperate. He was thoroughly conscientious. If he was looked upon by the Indian Government as a safe man, it was not merely because he always exercised a calm and dispassionate judgement, but because he was actuated in all that he did by the purest motives, and sustained by the highest principles. He was essentially an honest man. There was a directness of purpose about him which won the confidence of all with whom he associated. They saw that his one paramount desire was to do his duty to his country, by consulting in every way the welfare and honour of the troops under his command, and they knew that they would never be sacrificed, either on the one hand by the rash ambition, or on the other by the feebleness and indecision of their leader. The force to be despatched to Afghanistan required the superintendence and control of all officer equally cool and firm, temperate and decided and perhaps, in the whole range of the Indian army, the Government could not have found one in whom these qualities were more eminently combined than in the character' of General Pollock."

Pollock received orders at Agra on the 1st of January, 1842, to proceed forthwith to Peshawur, where he arrived on the 6th of February, and assumed command of the troops assembling there. While on this journey he received full intelligence of the disasters that had befallen the Cabul army, the extent and details of which became known in India towards the end of January. While these caused many to sigh over the tarnished reputation of the country, and to burn with desire to avenge the murder of their countrymen and the insults that had been heaped upon the nation, the Governor-General and Commander-in-chief seem to have been paralyzed, and to have thought only of the expediency of a retrogade movement on the part of all the remaining troops beyond the Indus, as soon as the safety of Sale's brigade had been secured, leaving the unfortunate captives, Including officers, soldiers, ladies and children, to the tender mercies of the treacherous Afghans, and to the chance of procuring their release by money. Not so, however, Mr. Clerk and some other brave spirits, who insisted that the safety and honour of the British power in India required that the garrison at Jellalabad should hold its own, until, reinforced by fresh troops, it could march in conjunction with the Candahar force upon Cabul, chastise the enemy on the theatre of their recent successes, and then the whole could withdraw altogether from Afghanistan with dignity and undiminished honour. The urgency of Mr. Clerk could not be withstood, and a third brigade, consisting of the 6th and 55thregiments of native infantry, the 1st regiment of native cavalry, two squadrons of European dragoons and a battery of horse artillery, was held in readiness to join the force at Peshawur.

While such was the state of indecision and panic in India, let us consider the position of affairs at Peshawur when Pollock arrived and assumed command. The fortress of Ali Musjid, lying some five miles within the Khyber Pass, of which it had always been regarded as the key, and about twenty-five miles from Peshawur, had been held by a few faithful natives under. the command of an English gentleman, Mr. Mackeson, who had nobly resisted the attacks of the Afreedies but, there being every chance of their being unable to sustain the defence much longer, Brigadier Wild detached one half of his brigade, the 53rd and 64th regiments of native infantry, on the 15th January, to garrison it. They reached their destination in safety, but by some unaccountable mismanagement left the cattle behind which were destined to feed them, and were thus shut up in an isolated fortress without provisions. The only hope of extrication from this dilemma lay in the advance of the two other regiments of the brigade, with their four borrowed Sikh guns, and the Sikh auxiliaries. The latter however mutinied and marched back to Peshawur. Wild, therefore, advanced on the 19th January, without them, but was disgracefully beaten back with the loss of his guns, notwithstanding the efforts of himself and officers, several of whom were wounded and one killed in endeavouring to rally the Sepoys, who had lost all heart, and were huddled together In confusion and dismay. The loss of the Sepoys was severe and the column fell back on Jumrood. This disaster brought about the abandonment of the fortress, the garrison retiring with some loss on the 24th January, when the four regiments were once more together at Jumrood, the officers, in spite of the disasters of the week, congratulating one another, and thankful "it was no worse."

After this, the brigade remained inactive in the vicinity of Peshawur, when the usual consequences of inactivity were soon painfully apparent. The Sepoys fell sick, crowded into hospital, and, without the audacity of open mutiny, gave utterance to language but little removed from it. Exposed to the alarming hints and alluring imputations of the mutinous Sikh soldiery, some began to desert their colours, while others openly declared that nothing should induce them again to face the horrors of the Khyber Pass. As Pollock hurried through the Punjaub the worst reports continued to meet him; not only was he informed that the troops of Wild's brigade were enfeebled by disease and paralyzed by terror, but that even the officers of the force were using, in an unguarded and unworthy manner, the language of disheartenment and alarm.

On the 6th February he reached Peshawur, and found that the stories he had heard on the road by no means exaggerated the condition of the troops under Brigadier Wild. There were then 1000 men in hospital, and the number was increasing alarmingly. In a few days it had increased to 1800; the morale of the troops was in the lowest possible state. Disaffection broke out openly among the Sepoys, and a few days after, when M'Caskill's brigade had arrived, four out of the five Sepoy regiments present refused to advance; this disaffection manifested itself by frequent desertions, calculated to cause the greatest uneasiness, and the more so, because this small force was 363 miles from the British frontier, and a Sikh army was encamped close at hand, spreading alarm, encouraging and screening desertions, who, although their ruler, the astute Runjeet Singh, had allowed the British forces to traverse his territory, and their chiefs were courteous and nominally friendly, could only be regarded as very doubtful allies. To quote from one of Pollock's dispatches "The Sikh soldiery, one and all, are Insolent, and do not scruple to express their wish that we may meet with reverses; they are a disorganised rabble, but dangerous as neighbours."

The taint which had affected the Sepoys had also reached some of the officers, who did not hesitate openly to express at the mess table the strongest opinions against a second attempt to force the Khyber, and to declare their belief that, if it were made, very few would return to Peshawur. One officer publicly asserted that it would be better to sacrifice Sale's brigade than to risk the loss of 12,000 men on the march to Jellalabad, and another said that, if an advance were ordered, he would do his best to dissuade every Sepoy of his corps from again entering the pass.

To instil new courage and confidence into the waverers was no easy task ; but coolly and sagaciously, as one who understood the cause of their disheartenment and could make some allowances for their misconduct, Pollock addressed himself to the work of reanimating and reassuring them. He visited the hospitals frequently, and by adding to the comforts of the men, shewed that he felt an interest In them. He saw every officer; he determined not to act with harshness towards the men, not calling them to courts-martial, he depended upon the influence of reason with them, and in the course of a very short time he succeeded in completely re-establishing the confidence which had been so deeply shaken. He made the Sepoys feel that they had been placed under the care of one who was mindful of their welfare and jealous of their honour; one who overlooked nothing that could contribute to the health and comfort of his men, and who would never call upon them to make sacrifices to which he would not cheerfully submit himself. There was in all he did such an union of firmness and kindness; he was so mild, so considerate, and yet so decided, that the Sepoys came in time to regard him with child-like faith, and when the hour of trial came, they were not found wanting.

All through the months of February and March Pollock remained inactive, but, mortifying as the delay was, no other course was open to him. His position was painful, but his duty plain. The safety of the gallant garrison of Jellalabad was to be secured by his advance.

On the 26th of January, in doubt whether. the government of Calcutta had any intention to make a genuine effort on a sufficient scale to relieve the garrison, and concluding from what had been heard of the views and measures of Lord Auckland, that they would be left to their fate, Sale summoned a council of War to consider a demand made to him by the Afghan Government, that he should leave the country. At this council, composed of men who had proved their valour and resource on many a battle field, the terms of a proposed capitulation were carried with but ONE dissentient voice, (that of Captain George Broadfoot, of the Bengal Engineers) who, to his honour it is recorded, took his stand boldly, and withstood every argument adduced in favour of the capitulation, and when, on the 12th of February, a reply came demanding further concessions from the beleaguered garrison, his arguments had such weight that the re-assembled council, after long debate and much opposition, did not renew the negotiation. Sir Robert Sale was thus happily left free to act as he should think fit; on the following day tidings arrived that reinforcements were moving up through the Punjaub; all doubt ceased and there was no more talk of withdrawal, but Sale and Macgregor nevertheless continued to write urgent letters to Pollock to push on without delay; it was still Pollock's hard duty to halt. The Sepoys were gradually recovering their health and spirits; reinforcements with British dragoons and horse artillery were on their way to join him, and He well knew that nothing could do more to reassure those who had been discouraged by previous failure than the knowledge that they would be supported in their advance by fresh troops, numbering among them a good proportion of Europeans. Had the advance been precipitated, it is probable that some of the native regiments would have refused to march, and by open mutiny have raised difficulties which it would have been impossible to overcome.

Still it required much firmness to resist the pressing appeals made to Pollock by his comrades at the other end of the Khyber, who having with enormous efforts and by frequent sorties, collected provisions which had enabled them to hold out so long, now found that their supplies would soon come to an end. Their rations, which were not of the best, had been reduced to such an extent that they were barely sufficient to keep the men in health and strength, fit for the exertions they were daily required to make, and which it was necessary to sustain if ever they w ere to be released from their present position.*

* Return of the Garrison of Jellalabad on the 14th of February, 1842.

Cavalry	Effective	241	Sick	21
Artillery		171		51
Sappers		304		45
Infantry	Europeans	719		30
	Sepoys	838		48
Total		2273		195 2468

A great calamity w as now again about to befall the garrison of Jellalabad. On the morning of the 19th February the men were toiling with pick and shovel with their wonted cheerfulness and activity, their arms piled within reach, flushed with joy at the thought of the near completion of the defences and the security they afforded against the hordes of Afghans now again assembling in their vicinity, when a fearful visitation of Providence suddenly and astoundingly turned all their labour into nothingness. There was an awful and mysterious sound as of thunder beneath their feet; then the earth shook; the houses of the town trembled and fell; the ramparts seemed to reel and totter, and then came down with a crash. On the first sound the men instinctively rushed to their arms, which were a short distance from the walls, and so the greater number escaped injury.

Although this earthquake* had wrought in a minute more ruin than a bombarding army could have done in a month, the garrison were in no wise disheartened. " No time," says Captain Broadfoot, "was lost. The shocks had scarcely ceased when the whole garrison was told off into working parties, and before night the breaches were scarped, the rubbish below them cleared away, whilst the great one was surrounded by a good gabion parapet."

* Pollock, at Peshawur, narrowly escaped death from the effect of this same earthquake, a heavy beam having fallen and crushed a table from which he and a party of his friends had just risen.

The Afghans, however, dared not to attack; they lost their opportunity, but hoping to subdue the garrison by starvation, drew closer round the fortress, establishing sungahs (screens for riflemen, built up with dry stones), from behind which they fired briskly on the defenders, until at length they were driven away by a sortie on the 11th March.

Scarcity of ammunition prevented the gallant defenders from following up this success , which, however, caused the rest of the month to pass quietly away. Provisions had become very scarce; their camels had long ago been killed; fodder for their horses was not to be obtained; the blockade was strict, and it is therefore easy to understand the eagerness with which Sale and Macgregor continued to urge Pollock to advance to their succour. They knew that if reduced to much greater straits they would cease to have the power to help themselves or to make a move to meet their deliverers. Pollock, however, remained firm. He knew the dangers before him; he had calculated the means at his disposal to overcome them, and he waited until the dragoons and horse artillery reached his camp, on the 30th March; on the following day he began to move forward.

Pollock had difficulties to encounter, besides those arising from his own command, from the Sikh army, who, although nominal allies, cordially detested the British nation, and regarded its disasters with secret delight, but ably seconded by the efforts of Mr. Clark, at the court of Lahore, and by Henry Lawrence, who was with him, Pollock gradually, by the influence of his character, overcame this feeling of aversion, and when the European reinforcements arrived, the Sikhs had resolved to face the dangers of, and to assist in forcing, the pass.

On the 31st March Pollock was at Jumrood, intending to advance on the following morning, but new elements of delay arose; the camel drivers were deserting in such numbers that there was not sufficient carriage for the ammunition. The Sikh General, Gholab Singh, had not moved up his camp, and the rain was descending in floods.

Pollock had already clone his best to reduce the baggage, but now issued a fine soldierly appeal to the army, which made men of all ranks feel that he was not less ready to make sacrifices himself than to call upon others to make them. One regiment of native infantry could not come up for want of cattle; Sepoys were deserting from Wild's brigade: "The pluck of the Sepoys," Pollock wrote, "was doubtful. I still much regret that I have not the 31st Queen's Regiment,* but after Sir Robert Sale's letter, I consider he has put it out of my power to wait longer, although I am quite sure the addition of 900 Europeans would operate very favourably for the prisoners."

* H.M.'s 31st Regiment, with the 6th Native Infantry, some resallah's of Tait's irregular Cavalry, a company of Foot Artillery and Major Delafosse's troop of Horse Artillery, all under the command of Colonel Bolton, of the 31st, had crossed the Sutlej on the 6th March on their way to Peshawur; which they reached on the 21st of April.

The interval of delay was well employed in completing the arrangements for the final advance, which was made on the 5th of April, in three columns, a centre one with the baggage, treasure, ammunition, and guns, and two flanking columns composed entirely of infantry. H.M.'s 9th regiment, the only European infantry with the force, were distributed between the three, to give confidence to the native soldiers, who now, however, behaved nobly; vieing with their European comrades, they carried the precipitous heights on either side, and driving the defenders from ridge to ridge, opened the door of the Khyber Pass, the enemy retreating to the fort of Ali Musjid, which they evacuated on the following morning.

A military writer in a work entitled: "Mountain Warfare," says, that Pollock's arrangements were so perfect in conception, and so complete in detail, "that it would be superfluous to attempt to elaborate or improve upon them;" and it may be added, that no better example can be given to the student of military history in search of knowledge of mountain warfare, than that of the forcing of the Khyber Pass, and of the subsequent operations of Pollock's army in the intricate defiles of Afghanistan.

By this defeat of an enemy, 10,000 strong, in an almost impregnable position, in spite of his barricades, in which he placed the greatest confidence, with the singularly small casualty roll of 135 killed and wounded (41 from H.M.'s 9th regiment), the Sepoys found they were not sacrificed, and, as Pollock wrote on the following day, "they are in the highest spirits and have a thorough contempt for the enemy. This is a great point gained. The Sikhs are encamped near us and are much more respectful since our operations of yesterday."

A small body of native troops took charge of the surrendered fortress, the Sikhs were left to guard the communications, and Pollock pressed on towards Jellalabad.

At the other end of the pass a glorious action was fought, on the following day, the 6th of April; the garrison, under Sale, moved out of the fortress and attacked Akbar Khan, who with 6000 men was drawn up in front of his camp, with his right resting on a fort and his left on the Cabul river, ready to receive them. The impetuosity of the British onslaught was not to be resisted by Afghan soldiers; they fought well and made repeated efforts to check, the advance, but "in a short time were dislodged from every point of their position, their cannon taken and their camp involved in a general conflagration. In short," as Sale wrote: "The defeat of Mahommed Akbar in open field, by the troops whom he had boasted of blockading, was complete and signal."

On the 16th of April Pollock reached Jellalabad, when Sale and his "illustrious" followers were relieved, after having been shut up for five long months in the fortifications, reared for the most part by their own energy.

As Pollock and his troops passed to their encamping ground the walls were manned by the garrison, a salute was fired and returned, and a loud and thrilling cheer burst forth to welcome them, a most exciting scene, in which so many hearts beat happily together in the ranks of the relieving and relieved, and grateful thoughts were lifted up to the Almighty in gratitude for a deliverance which, two months before, had appeared almost hopeless to all except Pollock and a few others inspired with like energy and devotion. Pollock, in the simplicity of his heart, wrote to a friend: "It was a sight worth seeing, all appeared happy."

The following reflection from "Sale's brigade," by the Rev. G. R. Gleig, the Chaplain General to the forces, who in his youth shared in the dangers of many a hard fought battle field in the Peninsula, under the Duke of Wellington, as a combatant officer of a light infantry regiment, and bears, in his old age, the scars of several wounds which attest his share in the dangers of war, is well worthy of consideration. It comes from a man of mature years, of large experience In wars and armies, and whose knowledge of historical events, with their causes and effects, is worthy of the deepest respect.

"And here let me not forget to record to the honour of the illustrious garrison, that regularly as the Lord's Day came round, brigade orders called both officers and men together, that in his own name and in the names of his comrades, one of themselves might present to their Father which is in heaven their common sacrifice of prayer and praise. It was a righteous custom, and produced upon all concerned the happiest effect. It sobered while it encouraged all, from the highest to the lowest, teaching them to feel that the lives of the brave are in the hands of Him who gave them; and that the best preparation which men can make for battle and for death comes out of a humble yet hopeful reliance on the mercy, as well as on the power, of the Most High. Nor do I think that I go beyond the line of sober truth if to the prevalence of this right feeling among them, aided by the happy absence of that bane of a soldier's usefulness, spirituous liquors, and the encouraged use of them, I attribute the patience, the good humour, the unwearied zeal, which from the beginning to the end of the siege characterised the behaviour of all classes, and rendered the garrison of Jellalabad, though few in number, invincible. Had the same tempers prevailed at Cabul, and the same wisdom been exhibited in the encouragement of them, who can doubt that the fate of General Elphinstone' s corps would have been different?"

Throughout the anxious period of Pollock's detention at Peshawur, he had felt deeply the chilling influence of the knowledge that his advocacy of a spirited policy met with hut a lukewarm response from the authorities in India. The avowed purpose for which Pollock's force was mainly formed, was "the withdrawal of the Jellalabad garrison in safety to Peshawur;" but Pollock urged a holder course, pointing out that the timid nature of his instructions which he was ordered "carefully and implicitly to obey," would, if followed, be attended with considerable risk, and have a very bad effect far and near, while by advancing beyond Jellalabad and thus seeking an opportunity of inflicting a signal punishment on the enemy, he might hope to effect the liberation of the prisoners In the enemy's hands and establish his superiority in such a manner as to secure his force from molestation during their subsequent withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, an important change had taken place in the Government of India. Lord Auckland had been relieved as Governor-General by Lord Ellenborough, whose arrival was hailed with satisfaction, great things being expected from his energy and spirit.

On the 15th of March, a few days after his arrival at Calcutta, Lord Ellenborough wrote to the Commander-in-chief:- "Whatever course we may hereafter take must rest solely on military considerations, and have in the first instance regard to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at Ghuznee, at Khelat-i-Ghilzye and Candahar; to the security of our troops in the field from all unnecessary risk, and finally, to the establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which may make it appear to them and to our own subjects and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities, and violate their faith."

"The relief of these garrisons," he wrote, "is a point deeply affecting the military character of the army; to effect the release of the prisoners taken at Cabul, is an object likewise deeply interesting In point of feeling and honour ; and with reference to it and the relief of Ghuznee, it may possibly become a question, in the event of Major-General Pollock's effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward position near Jellalabad, or even advance to Cabul."

This spirited letter struck a responsive chord in Indian society, which, keenly alive to the overwhelming danger incurred by British rule in the East, in consequence of late events, was desirous that the prestige of our military power, which had been so rudely shaken, should be firmly re-established, and with it the government of our Indian possessions. About this time, however, information was received of General England's unfortunate check, on the 28th March, when advancing from Quettah with a brigade conveying money and provisions for the garrison of Candahar. Having made an unsuccessful attack on a small native force at Hykulzye, that General decided, in opposition to the strongly expressed opinion of the political and other officers who accompanied him, to fall back and await further reinforcements at Quettah, before again attempting to open communications with General Nott at Candahar.

This unfortunate disaster, which was less the fault of the troops than of the General, seems to have discouraged the Governor-General, who on the 15th March had written, "In war reputation is strength," and over whom an entire change had come. Alluding to Pollock's and Sale's first successes, of which he had just received information, he wrote on the 22nd April:- "Although these events improve our prospects to some extent, they have in no respect altered my deliberate opinion that it is expedient to withdraw the troops under Major-General Pollock and those under Major-General Nott at the earliest practicable period, into positions wherein they may have certain and easy communication with India. That opinion is founded upon a general view of our military, political, and financial situation, and is not liable to be lightly changed." He looked upon Pollock's position as so hopeless that on the 4th May he wrote to him: "The most recent accounts which have been received of the difficulty experienced by you in obtaining supplies from Jellalabad, and in bringing forward supplies from Peshawur, and the very deficient means of movement, as well as of provisions which you possess, induce the Governor-General to expect that you will have already decided upon withdrawing your troops within the Khyber Pass, if considerations having regard to the health of the army should not have induced you to defer that movement. The first object of the Governor-General's anxiety has ever been to withdraw, with honour, into positions of security the several corps of the army scattered and surrounded in Afghanistan, That object may now be accomplished with respect to the army under your command; and the Governor-General could experience no higher satisfaction than that of hearing that the health of that army, in whose welfare he takes so deep an interest, having been preserved, it was in a secure position, having certain communication with India."

The safety of the army thus became the chief object of the Governor-General, for the accomplishment of which he decided to leave to their unhappy fate the English prisoners in the hands of the Afghans, among whom were two of the generals who commanded our army at Cabul, the widow of a murdered British envoy, the brave-hearted wife and the widowed daughter of the commander of the "illustrious garrison" of Jellalabad, with many other brave officers and tender women, captives in the fortresses of the Afghan Sirdars.

All attempt at rescue was abandoned, and any effort to re-establish our military reputation entirely repudiated, although upon that reputation, in his own opinion, only a short time before, the tenure of India depended. On the 29th April, the Commander-in- chief with the entire approval of the Governor-General, sent the following order to General Pollock:

1. Shah Soojah being dead, Ghuznee lost, and Major General Nott directed by his Lordship's command (also of the 19th instant) to withdraw the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghilzye, to evacuate Candahar, and to retire first upon Quettah, and, when the season admits, upon Sukkur; you are required to make a similar movement in Upper Afghanistan, and to withdraw every British soldier from Jellalabad to Peshawur.

2. You are to destroy the fort, and any useless guns; but as there need be no haste in the retreat when commenced, you are requested not to leave any trophies.

1st. That you have brought a negotiation for the release of the prisoners Iately confined at Budeeabad to such a point that you might risk its happy accomplishment by withdrawing.

2nd. That you have detached a lightly-equipped force to endeavour to rescue them.

3rd. That the enemy at Cabul may be moving a force to attack you. In this improbable case, should any respectable number of troops have descended into the plain below Jugdulluck with that intent, it would be most advisable to inflict, such a blow upon them as to make them long remember your parting effort. If you should have such a glorious opportunity,

4. I do not recommend delay in the first case, unless the prisoner's are actually on their way to your camp, as no faith can be placed in Afghan promises or oaths. The second would of course require that you should await the return of your detachment.

5. I allude entirely to the officers and ladies now or lately at Budeeabad, or its vicinity. Those at Cabul cannot, I think, be saved by any treaty or agreement made under existing circumstances at Jellalabad.

6. You will be pleased, on reaching Peshawur, to despatch to Ferozepore without delay the troops of all arms which so gallantly upheld our country's name at Jellalabad; and further instructions will be sent to you regarding the disposal of the other brigades. Sir Robert Sale may be permitted to remain at your head-quarters, should he desire to do so, and you will transfer him accordingly to another command, placing Brigadier Monteith in charge of the returning column."

Similar orders had been sent on the 19th April to Nott to withdraw the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghilzye, evacuate Candahar, and take up a position at Quetta until the season would permit of his retiring altogether from Afghanistan.

It has been necessary to enter into this detail in order properly to appreciate the difficulty of Pollock's position, by a thorough knowledge of which alone a true estimate can be formed of his character.

We find him, then, in command of a small victorious army, but ill-found with means of transport and provisions, encamped near Jellalabad, with the Khyber Pass in his rear; and beyond it the Sikh empire, separating him by 350 miles from the British frontier. In his front a haughty insolent enemy in a mountainous country of the most intricate and difficult nature for military operations, the whole population hostile to him and confident of their strength and of their power to defend their fastnesses, while General Nott was in a very critical position at Candahar, near the other extremity of Afghanistan, in command of a small force with detachments closely invested in Ghuznee and Khelat-i-Ghilzye, there being no direct means of communication between the two generals except by hired natives who carried concealed despatches written in colourless ink.

This was Pollock's position when he received these positive orders to retire, which, as a soldier, he was bound to obey, unless some important event or events known to himself, but unknown to and unforeseen by the Commander-in-chief had occurred in the meanwhile, which had so changed the aspect of affairs as to warrant him in taking the very grave responsibility of acting otherwise than in accordance with the explicit instructions he had received. The only military event of this nature that had occurred was the surrender of Ghuznee, of which Pollock received intelligence on the 22nd April. By this surrender Colonel Palmer, who commanded, and the surviving officers and men of the garrison, were added to the roll of prisoners already in the hands of the Afghans.

Fortunately for Great Britain the command of the army had been confided to a man of enlarged views, capable, of appreciating the mature of the crisis in which he was called upon to play so important a part, possessed of sound judgment and with a large share of moral courage. If Pollock had acted according to the letter and spirit of his instructions and brought his army safe back to India, he would have been relieved of all responsibility as to the abandonment of the captives and as to any other effects, political or otherwise, induced by his retreat, and the Government could not have refused him the honours always granted to a successful general, and which would have been at least equal to those awarded to him after a much more noble career.

Pollock, however, foresaw the danger to the political power of Great Britain in the East, which could inevitably have been incurred, if he had retired without striking a decisive blow and inflicting a signal punishment on the faithless murderers of our army, and his nature abhorred an act which by the cowardly abandonment of helpless women and children, would attach to the Government and name of Great Britain a stigma that could never have been removed.

Pollock simply sat down to his desk and wrote to General Nott, requesting him on no account to retire until he should hear again from him. Nott, meanwhile, had been reinforced, on the 10th May, by General England's division from Quettah. This General, having advanced to the southern entrance of the Kojuck Pass, halted there, not daring to move through it, although pressed to do so by the officers of his force, until the pass had been cleared by a weak brigade, detached under Colonel Wymer, from the Candahar garrison, which escorted him through it.

Nott, upon whom the peremptory order to retire had come like a thunderclap, and who conceived such a measure impossible until Cabul should be retaken, gladly agreed to remain at Candahar until he should hear again from Pollock.

In a letter written many years afterwards to Mr. C. R. Lowe , the author of his life and correspondence, which has been freely used in making this compilation, Sir George Pollock looking back on the past says:

The pusillanimity of the Government and the importance of the crisis may be judged of by the proceedings of Sir James Outram, then politically employed in Sindh. So dangerous did he consider the orders given to General Pollock that he at once wrote that "our bitterest foe could not have devised a more injurious measure, whether viewed politically or in a military light;" and upon receiving intelligence of Pollock's decision, "I honour the general, and should he be allowed to carry out his views, we shall have mainly to thank him, not only for retrieving our honour in Afghanistan but for saving India to us, the loss of which would ultimately result from disgracefully succumbing to the Afghans now. . . . . . Nothing is easier than to retrieve our honour in Afghanistan, previously to finally withdrawing, should the Government so determine; and I pray God, Lord Ellenborough may at once see the damnable consequences of shirking the undertaking, and order accordingly, otherwise the disaster of Cabul will be but the commencement of our misfortunes."

Pollock was still detained at Jellalabad when he received a despatch, dated the 28th of April, from the Chief Secretary, in which the Governor-General, contemplating the possibility that he may have been led, by the absence of serious opposition and by the natural desire of a true soldier, to advance upon Cabul, reasserted his "opinion that the only safe course is that of withdrawing the army at the earliest practicable period into positions within the Khyber Pass, where it may possess easy and certain communications with India." And within a week another despatch, in which he declared that he expected that Pollock had already decided to withdraw his troops, "if considerations, having regard to the health of the army, should not have induced you to defer that movement."

The idea of the advance seems to have been a temporary apprehension arising out of a not erroneous estimate of the military aspirations of General Pollock; but it very soon passed away. It had, however, one important result. It called forth from the General the following soldierlike letter:

Pollock thus grasped eagerly at the faintest indication of willingness on the part of the Governor-General to place any discretionary power in his hands, and expressed his eagerness to traverse the scene of our recent humiliation. If he had had the carriage he would have advanced at once, but the want of it had kept him inactive in the neighbourhood of Jellalabad, and he adroitly turned it to good account to gain time, asserting he had not the means of retiring to Peshawur. Meanwhile, he exerted himself to obtain, by negotiation, the release of the prisoners.

The announcement of the Governor-General's determination to withdraw the troops from their advanced troops having reached Candahar, Nott wrote to the chief secretary, on the 17th of May:

It was plain that he read the orders of the supreme government not without acute mortification, but he yielded a prompt though grudging assent, and on the 19th May, despatched a brigade under Colonel Wymer, to bring off the garrison and destroy the works of Khelat-i-Ghilzye.

A gallant attempt was made by the enemy to anticipate the relief of this fortress by a desperate assault, on the 21st May, which was nobly repulsed by Craigie and his men, who inflicted a loss of near five hundred men upon the enemy.

During Wymer's absence the Afghans determined to make another attempt against Candahar, but were signally beaten, on the 29thMay, by Nott, who sallied out with 1500 men of all arms, and attacked a force of 8000 men in position and 2000 in reserve, breaking them up and inflicting heavy losses upon them. Nott now remained undisturbed at Candahar, collecting transport and preparing for his retirement from Afghanistan.

Pollock's letter to the Chief Secretary, of the 13th May, elicited no answer, but a letter written a week afterwards was more successful, in which, after pointing out the evils and difficulties of an immediate withdrawal to Peshawur, he asked for authority to remain till October or November. On the 1st June the Governor General, being in a more chivalrous mood, replied through the Chief Secretary, "It would be more desirable, undoubtedly, that before finally quitting Afghanistan, you should have an opportunity of striking a blow at the enemy, and since circumstances seem to compel you to remain there till October, the Governor-General earnestly hopes that you may be enabled to draw the enemy into a position in which you may strike a blow effectually," and "it will be for your consideration whether your large army, one half of which would beat, in open field, everything that could be brought against it in Afghanistan, should remain entirely inactive during the period which must now apparently elapse before it can finally return. Although you may not have, or soon be able to procure, the means of moving your whole army, you may possibly be able to move a part of it rapidly against some portion of the enemy's force incautiously exposed, and of giving it a severe blow."

This letter was most welcome, and every effort was made to collect carriage-cattle, ostensibly for the purpose of withdrawal, but Pollock looked forward to their employment for a far different purpose, and meanwhile continued his negotiations for the release of the captives, but he carefully avoided making any condition with the Afghan Sirdars which might fetter the advance on Cabul, which he kept steadily in view.